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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JASON JEPPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF 
Court of Appeal No. 2002043-CA 
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Judgment and Sentence in this Criminal Class A Misdemeanor offense sought 
to be reviewed was entered by the Fourth District Court after a bench trial on April 10, 
2002, in and for Utah County, Orem Department, State of Utah. Statutory authority 
exists for this Appeal based upon the Rule 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The Appellant's sentence was stayed pending this appeal. There are no 
related or prior appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THE STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
AND CITATIONS 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE BASED UPON THE 
FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
OFFENSE AND THE COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING THE VICTIMS 
TESTIMONY WAS FALSE 
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court has established the standard in making the 
determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction, an 
appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder. It is not the function of a reviewing 
court to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility of witnesses. The mere 
existence of conflicting evidence, therefore, does not warrant reversal. Rather, the 
function of a reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is sufficient competent 
evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 
1991) When reviewing a jury verdict for sufficient evidence, this court must review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury and reverse only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of law 
and subject to review by this Court without defense to the trial court.Sweeney v. Happy 
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Valley, Inc., 417 P.2d 126,130 (1966); However, erroneous admissions of evidence in a bench 
trial may rise to the level of reversible error. 
Citation to Record: (Transcript of Trial page 44) 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO ARREST 
JUDGEMENT 
Standard of Review: Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." The substantial rights of a defendant are 
affected only where a review of the record persuades the Appellate Court that without the error 
there was "fa reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.'" State v. 
Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) .State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982)). 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256-57 (Utah 1988); State v. Cloud 122 P.2d 750, (Utah 
1986);and, State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983). 
Citation to Record: (Transcript of Sentencing page 4) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-5-109 Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age. 
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs the physical condition 
of the child, including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not a serious 
physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
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2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or custody of such 
child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense 
as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody of such child, 
causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment by spiritual means 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, or upon 
motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute 
a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest 
of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the 
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant 
is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the 
prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing 
any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal prosecution based upon a Class A Misdemeanor information 
charging the Appellant with child abuse in Utah County, State of Utah. (The Information 
is attached in Appendix) The Information was filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Orem, Utah, and after a pretrial hearing the case assigned to the Honorable Judge 
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Backlund for further proceeding. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The matter proceeded to a bench trial in Orem, Utah. A verdict of guilty was 
entered by the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
After the Jury trial, the Appellant was sentenced to probation as set forth in the 
Judgement attached as an exhibit in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The first witness called at the trial was T J. Hardman who testified that she was 
the mother of Austin Hardman and lived with him at a residence located at 806 South 
1640 West, Orem, Utah on the date charged on December 4, 2001. (Tr. pg. 7) 
2. Mrs. Hardman testified that her relationship with Jason Jeppson was that they 
were friends but were engaged to be married and was basically a live in boyfriend. (Tr. 
Pg. 8) 
3. As to the incident, she testified as follows (Tr. pg. 11): 
Q. So even though you lived with him a year you're not still, you weren't 
sure at that time how he would be upset or not? 
A. I was on the back side of him so I don't know because I didn't see his 
facial expressions or anything. I don 't know. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember telling the officers that it was with a closed 
fist? 
A. I don't remember telling them that. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember speaking with the officers that evening? 
A. Yes, 
Q. And do you remember telling them the story of what-
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A. Uh-hug (affirmative). 
Q. -that evening? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
4. She indicated that Austin was 13 at the time and that he had been under arrest 
earlier that evening. (Tr. pg. 12) 
5. She testified that Jason Jeppson was going to work and that they had taken an 
extra long period of time to get back from the wrestling match in the family car. (Tr. 
pg.14) 
6. Mrs. Hardman describes the contact between her boyfriend Jason and the minor 
child as follows (Tr. pg. 15): 
A. He, he stood up like this kind of in a wrestling, you know how you go to 
attack somebody when you're wrestling. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then he reached over and grabbed the back of Austin's head and 
just kind of went like that, just joking around. 
Q. Okay. Now you had been to that wrestling match that day, that day, 
hadn't your? 
A. Un-huh (affirmative). 
7. The next witness was Austin Hardman, the alleged victim, that testified on 
December 4, 2001 the following occurred (Tr. pg. 22): 
A. well, we were sitting there eating dinner. And my little brother burped 
so my mom told Jason to reach over and slap him. And Jason just sat there and he ate. 
And so I burped and then my mom told Jason to slap me just like she told my little 
brother. And he just kept eating. And so, and so he, my little brother burped again so I 
reached over and I slapped him. And then Jason he was finished eating so he stood up 
and he kind of burped but he kept his mouth closed. So I just reached over and I kind of 
slapped him, not hard or anything. And so he reached over the table and just kind of 
grabbed my head, but I put my head down so, so he didn't really grab it and put it down. 
He just kind of grabbed my head and just kind of slapped me on the back of the head 
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three times. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And so he walked over to the sink and he cleaned his plate, and he went 
up to my mom's room and got his stuff. And me and him got in an argument, and we just 
started yelling at each other and I told him to go to work. And so he got, he got his keys 
off the counter and walked outside and go in his car and left to work. 
8. The witness testified that he felt like he was hit by an open hit and that the he 
was not hurt by the contact. (Tr. pg. 23) 
9. He then went up to his room and called his father he indicated as follows: 
A. Because I was mad at him and I, I always call my dad when I'm mad at 
somebody. And he kind of tells me to settle down and stuff and he kind of helps me 
through my madness. 
10. The city then offered the testimony by means of a proffer of the two 
investigating officers, Officer Crowther and Officer Martinez. The proffer was stated as 
follows: 
MR. JOHANSON: And they were told by each of the children that they saw 
Jason stand up and slap him with a closed fist. Just, basically what was in the police 
report. 
THE JUDGE: Told by each of the three boys? 
MR. JOHANSON: Correct. And yes, Kelton and Garrick, when they were 
separated and went to a different room after the officers arrived. 
THE JUDGE: And that they were told by each, you're talking about the two 
boys or three? 
MR. JOHANSON: Yes, There's Kelton, Garrick and Austin. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHANSON: Three boys. 
THE JUDGE: And then each of them said that -
MR. JOHANSON: And Garrick and Kelton both told the -
THE JUDGE: the Defendant hit Austin with a closed fist. 
MR. JOHANSON: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: And each officer was told that separately by the boys? 
MR. JOHANSON: I believe it was either Officer Crowther or Officer 
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Martinez. Fm not sure which one. And I can ask. I think it was Crowther though, Your 
Honor. 
11. The last witness called from the city was Officer Martinez who works for 
Orem City Public Safety who went to the residence on December 4, 2001 after Eric 
Hardman had called. When he arrived he indicated that he discussed the matter with the 
minor child, Austin, who testified that Austin had said the Jason had stood up and leaned 
over the table and pushed his head on the table and that Jason had hit him on the back of 
the head three times (Tr. pg. 36). 
12. When he was by the prosecutor if he looked for any kind of indication of 
assault on Austin and he indicated that there was no indication of assault or red marks. 
(Tr.pg.36) 
13. On cross-examination the officer testified that there were no need for medical 
attention and that Austin indicated that his head was hurt by the incident. (Tr. pg. 39) 
14. At the conclusion of the city's case, counsel for the Defendant moved to 
dismiss the charges based upon the failure to prove child abuse and affliction of serious 
physical injury. 
15. Jason Jeppson took the stand and testified at length concerning the event that 
took place on the evening before he was leaving for his employment at Jordan Valley 
Water Conservancy District. (Tr. pg. 50) 
16. He testified that at the time of the incident he was getting ready to wash his 
plate to get ready for work. At that time he burped and Austin got up and leaned across 
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the table and hit him across the face. (Tr. pg. 53) 
17. He indicated that what had happened was horseplay and he described how he 
had to lean across the table out of contact. (Tr. pg. 56) 
18. Mr. Jeppson testified that on the way to work he was surprised when Austin 
yelled at him and said that his father was contacting the police and did not believe there 
was a problem and requested the officers to call him at work. (Tr. pg. 58) 
19. He testified that the amount of injury in no way caused any physical injury and 
it was merely a slap that took place with his fingers. (Tr. pg. 59) 
20. He testified that he was not in any manner disciplining the child at the time of 
the minor contact. (Tr. pg. 66) 
21. And that it was made in the context that all of the children were joking around 
and belching at the dinner table. (Tr. pg. 73) 
22. The defense called as a witness Garrick Hardman who testified that he 
observed the contact and that Austin wasn't crying and he didn't look hurt but was angry 
and mad at the time. (Tr. pg. 77) 
23. The defense then called again to the stand Austin Hardman in light of the 
statements made by the Judge as to whether or not he was telling the truth. He indicated 
that no one was putting pressure on him to say anything different than what had actually 
happened. (Tr. pg. 82) 
24. He indicated that concerning the claim that he was bruising or was hurt and 
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stated as follows (Tr. pg. 83): 
A. I wasn't hurt. It's just the only, the only reason my head hurt was 
because of wrestling. And I was really mad at him so I thought, so I over exaggerated 
and said it was him that hurt me, my head, but it was really wrestling. 
Q. All right. And you had a wrestling match that day. Was it a pretty 
tough match? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And did you win or lose the match? 
A. I won. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT, 
The Appellant was convicted at the bench trial even though the alleged victim 
denied that he was hurt in the incident at the dinner table. The Court determined that the 
teenage boy was not telling the truth because of the fact that in domestic abuse cases it the 
Judges opinion usual for the alleged victim to lie at trial based upon prior experience from 
other trials. 
The Court then also discounted the unrebutted and corroborated testimony of Mr 
Jeppson based on the same opinion. The Appellant was found guilty based upon 
speculation on the out of court statements received for the limited purpose of impeaching 
the witnesses. The Appellant requests that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing the 
information at the close of the State's case on direct, in not finding the appellant not guilty, 
and in denying the Motion to Arrest Judgement. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
It is fundamental in Utah that in all criminal prosecutions, that the prosecution 
must prove all elements of a criminal offense. In State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159 (Utah 
App. 06/02/2000), this Court stated in finding evidence insufficient at a preliminary 
hearing, where the standard is lower than at trial: 
The State is correct in its assertions that at a preliminary hearing all evidence must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and that the court must 
draw all reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor. See State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). But here, the State failed to provide the magistrate 
with facts from which a fact-finder could draw a reasonable inference—as opposed 
to a wild guess~of Hester's intent to arrange a drug sale. Instead, the State was 
really asking the magistrate to give the fact-finder a chance to speculate as to 
Hester's intent to arrange a drug sale. Such speculation flies in the face of the 
evidence presented, which establishes a strong case of theft by deception-not one 
of arranging a drug deal.... While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a difference 
between drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating about possibilities. 
An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a 
logical consequence from them." Black's Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed. 1999). 
Stated another way, "(a]n inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact 
which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn 
from proof of other facts." Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me, 
1968). On the other hand, speculation is defined as the "act or practice of 
theorizing about matters over which there is no certain knowledge/1 Black's 
Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed. 1999). 
In Hester, this Court discusses the use of implication from established fact versus 
speculation at preliminary hearing where the burden of persuasion is substantially lower 
than the reasonable doubt standard at trial. The Appellant submits that only by means of 
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speculation was the trial court able to enter findings as to all the elements of the charged 
offense. Further, the Court used a presumption or judicial notice from other child abuse 
cases to disregard the objective testimony presented at the bench trial. 
The Appellant requests that the Court review the testimony of the minor child at the 
trial.(Transcript at trial page 22 and page 82) There the alleged victim, Eric Hardman 
took the stand on two occasions and denied that he had been hurt by the minor contact by 
the Defendant. Eric Hardman testified that what occurred was merely horseplay which 
occurred after his wrestling matches at the high school. He testified that he was not 
seriously injured or had any bodily injury committed against him at the time of the brief 
incidental contact between him and the Defendant. The prosecution did not discredit or 
develop any inconsistency in his testimony. 
The lack of impeachment or inconsistency on cross examination at trial is 
significant. Especially when the prosecution and the Court must overcome the testimony 
on direct in order to base finding on inconsistent out of court statements not made upon 
oath and recounted by third parties. 
The burden was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the type of injury by rasing the 
circumstantial evidence while disregarding the direct evidence under oath at trial. In State 
v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the Court noted that the quality and 
quantity of circumstantial evidence in that case was insufficient to reasonably exclude 
reasonable alternative hypotheses and, thus, that the evidence required the fact finder to 
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indulge inference upon inference to reach a Conclusion that the defendant was guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Here the State had to overcome the direct testimony of the 
alleged victim to create a nexus between the contact and the alleged injury of the report 
from out of court statements. 
Significantly the Defendant was not charged with a Class B Misdemeanor involving 
recklessness or negligence. The City proceeded to the bench trial with a Class A 
Misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 76-5-109 (1953). That section states: 
The Information charged child abuse alleging the Defendant "intentionally or 
knowingly" inflicted physical injury upon a child. Physical injury is defined under 
the statute as an injury or condition which impairs the physical condition of the 
child including a bruise or contusion of the skin, minor lacerations or any other 
condition which impairs the health and welfare of the child. Utah Code Annotated 
76-5-109(1953) 
The Defendant admitted to the contact but clearly and objectively stated that his 
mental intent was not to intentionally inflict injury. He described the context of the contact 
at the dinner table in front of all of the residents of the household in the context of 
horseplay and in relation joking that was taking place. The teenage boy then placed a call 
to his father that was divorced form his mother. It was his father who did not observe any 
contact that contacted the Orem City police. 
At the close of the city's case the evidence the prosecution had not meet the basic 
element of the offense as to actual infliction of injury. The officer indicated that there was 
no bruising or lacerations that could be seen and the alleged victim himself admitted that 
there was no pain from the minor contact at the dinner table. 
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The trial court disregarded the testimony of the alleged victim at the stand 
essentially taking judicial notice of the fact that most victims of domestic abuse do not tell 
the truth at trial.1 Under this position a person charges with a domestic offense under the 
trial court's test is basically guilty because the initial reports are the truthful reports made 
to the police officers and the admission of the hearsay statements would rebut the actual 
statements made in open Court. However, there was no evidence or showing at the trial of 
any actual motivation to fabricate or change the testimony. The prosecution never 
impeached the witness at the hearing or significantly challenged the testimony. 
The trial court could take judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the scientific 
principles and techniques at issue if they have been generally accepted by the "relevant 
scientific community." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997)(citing State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)). However, if judicial notice is inappropriate, "the 
court must determine whether the party seeking to have the evidence admitted has 
sufficiently demonstrated the inherent reliability of the underlying principles and 
techniques." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996) (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
THE JUDGE: That is so typical-
MR. GAITHER: Excuse me. 
THE JUDGE: That is so typical of child abuse and domestic violence abuse 
that the initial statement to the officer without the victim taking time to reflect on the 
consequences to the perpetrator of what their statement might mean, without having other 
people affect or influence their testimony, an officer comes, it's fresh on their mind. I mean, 
defense attorneys all the time cross examine the prosecution witnesses and say how can you 
possible say that your recollection today is better than it was at the time of the incident. 
That's a common trial tactic. 
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statements that were admitted for the limited purpose for impeaching the alleged victims2. 
That placed the State in the unusual situation of impeaching the source of evidence and 
therefore there was not sufficient residuum of evidence. The finder of fact cannot rely 
exclusively on hearsay evidence and they must be supported by a residuum of legal 
evidence. Wagstaffv. Department of Employment, 826 P2d 1069 (Utah 1992). 
The "fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 
2The city offered the testimony by means of a proffer of the two investigating officers, 
Officer Crowther and Officer Martinez. The proffer was stated as follows: 
MR. JOHANSON: And they were told by each of the children that they saw 
Jason stand up and slap him with a closed fist. Just, basically what was in the police report. 
THE JUDGE: Told by each of the three boys? 
MR. JOHANSON: Correct. And yes, Kelton and Garrick, when they were 
separated and went to a different room after the officers arrived. 
THE JUDGE: And that they were told by each, you're talking about the two 
boys or three? 
MR. JOHANSON: Yes, There's Kelton, Garrick and Austin. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHANSON: Three boys. 
THE JUDGE: And then each of them said that -
MR. JOHANSON: And Garrick and Kelton both told the -
THE JUDGE: the Defendant hit Austin with a closed fist. 
MR. JOHANSON: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: And each officer was told that separately by the boys? 
MR. JOHANSON: I believe it was either Officer Crowther or Officer 
Martinez. I'm not sure which one. And I can ask. I think it was Crowther though, Your 
Honor. 
The last witness called from the city was Officer Martinez who works for Orem City 
Public Safety who went to the residence on December 4,2001 after Eric Hardman had called. 
When he arrived he indicated that he discussed the matter with the minor child, Austin, who 
testified that Austin had said the Jason had stood up and leaned over the table and pushed his 
head on the table and that Jason had hit him on the back of the head three times (Tr. pg. 36). 
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1983). The State failed to meet the burden of proof to prove all of the elements of the 
offense and to cover the gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO PROVE 
THE ELEMENTS OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE 
The Appellant on appeal requests that the Court on appeal reverse and remand this 
case before an entry of an Order of Judgment of Acquittal The Appellant requests the 
court should review the Order denying the Motion to Dismiss or the Motion to Arrest 
Judgement. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that the Court may arrest of 
judgment at any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted 
do not constitute a public offense. Here the State never introduce sufficient evidence to 
prove the elements of the offense of child abuse. Therefore, the Trial Court should have 
granted the Motion made at the close of the State's case for a an Order arresting 
Judgement of Acquittal, especially in light of the Courts perspective on the facts as 
revealed by his statements at the sentencing. 
At sentencing the Court stated: 
THE JUDGE: That is so typical-
MR. GAITHER: Excuse me. 
THE JUDGE: That is so typical of child abuse and domestic violence abuse 
that the initial statement to the officer without the victim taking time to reflect on the 
consequences to the perpetrator of what their statement might mean, without having other 
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people affect or influence their testimony, an officer comes, it's fresh on their mind. I 
mean, defense attorneys all the time cross examine the prosecution witnesses and say how 
can you possible say that your recollection today is better than it was at the time of the 
incident. That's a common trial tactic. 
And I look at that, and I think this little boy who got his head slapped three 
times by Mr. Jeppson at the dinner table and had his head held down while he was slapped 
three times across the back of the head, either slapped or hit with a closed fist, would be 
much more likely to tell the truth to the officer at the time it was investigated than months 
later when Mr. Jeppson is still living in the home and he's the boyfriend of the child's 
mother, and he has a chance to think about this and think well gee, he might go to jail 
because of something I've said, is much more likely to come to court months later and say, 
you know, I don't think he really hit me or it was just kind of a little brush on the back of 
the head. The night it happened he was crying, he was upset, he told a person that it hurt, 
he called his father, he wanted the police called, and then all of the sudden at the time it 
was kind of a little brushing of the back of the head and it was innocent horseplay. (Tr. 
Pg-8) 
THE JUDGE: He said my, he said my head still hurts. At the trial he never 
said anything about his head hurting from wrestling at the time he talked to the officer. In 
the trial he said well maybe I hurt it wrestling, although there was never any evidence of 
that as they drove home from Payson from the wrestling match or in the house or eating at 
the table, there wasn't one word about his head hurting from wrestling. He never told 
anybody that. But at the trial he had to explain away... 
See, Mr. Gaither, this is what happens. He had to explain why he told the 
officer his head hurt so he said well, maybe it hurt from wrestling, you know, that's how 
that occurred, that's my opinion. 
But I'm going to deny the motion to arrest judgement. I think there was 
ample evidence here of child abuse, I think I called it a classic example of child abuse, 
someone losing their temper and striking out at a child and hitting the child with a closed 
fist on the back of the head and hurting the child. That's child abuse. I don't think it's the 
most serious case of child abuse I've ever seen, of course, of course not, but it doesn't do 
any good for Mr. Jeppson not to recognize that he lost his temper and hit a 15-year-old 
boy. Let's move on here and get some therapy and treatment and try to build up a 
relationship. That's the way I look at this case. (Tr. pg. 15) 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You can't... It's okay to have fiin with your boys, you 
know. I mean, once in a while I'll wrestling with my kids, you know, they always beat me 
now I'm getting old. But it's just, it never gets tot he point where someone is getting mad 
or someone loses their temper or someone hits somebody else, you know, and that's the 
line that was crossed. You're the adult here, he's the child. You can't cross the line and 
suddenly lose your temper and lash out. And you've got to be kind of an example here. If 
you're going to marry Austin's mother and be a loving nurturing stepfather which I hope 
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you will be, your know, think you are, you supported them, you went to their wrestling 
meet, you're trying to be nice. But sitting there and making obscene noises at the table and 
burping and people slapping each other, that's beyond horesplay, it's gross. (Tr. pg. 18) 
After trial, the Defendant moved the Court after trial to arrest judgment and to enter 
a verdict judgement of acquittal pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The Motion was based upon the following grounds and reasons: 
1. The verdict and the finding of the elements of the offense was based upon hear 
say statements which were admitted for the purposes of impeaching the alleged victims. 
2. The alleged victims took the stand and testified to facts consistent with the 
offense and did not establish any elements of the offense. 
3. The Court is not able to base a finding on any non-sufficient non hearsay 
evidence to sustain a conviction. 
4. The Appellant respectfully requests that the Court revise the Order changing the 
Motion to Arrest Judgement because no criminal offense was proven at trial. 
The basic parameters of the relationship would indicate that Mr. Jeppson was not 
and never used any discipline. The attempt of the Court and prosecution to characterize 
this as an instance of discipline is not consistent with Mr. Jeppson's actual position and 
the objective evidence.. 
The statements of the Judge at sentencing demonstrates that the Court was 
offended by the conduct of the Appellant and actually not find the elements of the offense 
at trial. The Court entered findings not based on the evidence, but on personal preferences 
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and opinions. The elements of the offense were never proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
and the trial court should have arrested the judgement on Motion of the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Court should reaffirm the requirement at rial of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of objective proof of the elements of an offense. The conviction here was based upon opinion 
and preferences never introduced in evidence. Every person charged in a court where the 
Judge discounts all evidence at trial based upon the presumption that the victims lie at trial will 
be convicted, despite the evidence introduced at the trial. 
Therefore, the Court should have granted the Motion made at the close of the State's 
case for a Judgement of Acquittal and the Appellant on appeal requests that the Court on 
appeal reverse and remand this case before an entry of an Order of Judgment of Acquittal. 
The Appellant also requests the court should reverse the denial of Motion to arrest judgement. 
% , DATED this HS&w of September, 2002. 
RANDALL GAITHgR 
Attorney for the Appellant 
V 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Information 
2. Judgement and Sentence 
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DATE FILED 
ARR. DATE _ 
F O U R T H D I S T R I C T C O U R T , S T A T E O F U T A H 
U T A H C O U N T Y , C I T Y O F O R E M D E P A R T M E N T 
CITY OF OREM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Jason M. Jeppson 
806 South 1640 West 
Orem, UT 84058 
Defendant 
DOB: 11-10-66 
The undersigned Officer under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crime(s) of: 
CHILD ABUSE, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-5-109(3), Utah Code Annotated (1992), which 
the City of Orem has adopted in Section 9-1 -1 , Orem City Code (as amended), in that on or about December 4,2001, 
in Orem, Utah County, Utah, the defendant did intentionally or knowingly inflict physical injury upon a child or 
having the care or custody of such child, intentionally or knowingly caused or permitted another to inflict physical 
injury upon a child. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
Officer Martinez 
Orem Department of Public Safety 
Prosecutor 
12-20-01 
Summons 
INFORMATION 
Case No. ^ i W ^ 
OTNNo. 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - OREM COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JASON M JEPPSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
REVIEW HEARING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 011202209 MO 
Judge: JOHN C. BACKLUND 
Date: April 10, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kayr 
Prosecutor: JOHANSON, JUSTIN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GAITHER, RANDALL T. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 10, 19GG 
Audio 
Tape Number: 142 Tape Count: 170 
CHARGES 
1. CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/28/2002 Guilty 
HEARING 
Motion to arreBt judgment argued by defense; denied by Judge. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Baaed on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a Class 
A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Page 1 
Case No: 011202209 
Date; Apr 10, 2002 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge U 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2100.00 
Surcharge: $183 .70 
Due: $400.00 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
The fine is to be paid 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
$2500.00 
$2100.00 
$183.78 
$400.00 
Plus Interest 
in full by 09/1 r./2002 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Court Probation. 
Defendant j.s to pay a fine of 4 00.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before September 15, 2002. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws 
Keep address current with the court. 
Pay fines and fees as ordered. 
Appear when requested. 
Evaluation and subsequent court-ordered treatment 
Probation to be supervised by Intervention-Defendant to report to 
their office within 24 hours of this court date 
NO FORCE OF ANY KIND AGAINST CHILDREN! 
To complete both the Turning Point Parenting Program and the Anger 
Management Program through UVSC; call today to schedule/ complete 
by Oct 31, 2002 with proofs to court. 
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Case No: 011202209 
Date: Apr 10, 2002 
Dated this 4 day of ^ 4 , 200> . A " - " X V 
JOHN fJ BACKLUND 
Distr(jrct Court Judge ^<VJ 
Page 3 (last) 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the _ZJ^y of September, 2002, 
foregoing BRIEF was mailed First Classt, postage prepaid to: 
OREM CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
ATTN: JUSTIN JOHANSON 
56 NORTH STATE 
OREM, UTAH 84057 
FAX: 1-801-229-7302 
DATED this ay of September, 2002. 
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